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Adding Ideology to the Equation: New Predictions for Election Results under Compulsory Voting

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  • Fernanda L L de Leon

    (University of East Anglia)

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    Abstract

    This paper provides new predictions for compulsory elections, taking into consideration the differences in ideological views between compulsory and voluntary voters. Having explored Brazil's dual voting system, I predict changes in Americans' preferences and estimate a voting model applied to US senatorial elections. I find that, if the current voting population had ideological preferences of a compulsory electorate, Democrats would gain 8.7 percentage points in their vote shares and win 68% of the elections. Moreover, candidates that are voted for less would be the ones that gain more votes under compulsory elections, while this system would be most detrimental for highly voted-for candidates. Another consequence includes the candidates' reaction while converging in the ideological spectrum.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. in its series University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series with number 044.

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    Date of creation: Apr 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:uea:aepppr:2012_44

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    1. Ebonya Washington & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2009. "Sticking with Your Vote: Cognitive Dissonance and Political Attitudes," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 86-111, January.
    2. Train,Kenneth E., 2009. "Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521747387.
    3. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1560, David K. Levine.
    4. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
    5. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2010. "Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 814577000000000498, www.najecon.org.
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