Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment: Comment, Second Version
AbstractApesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (APH, forthcoming) report for a sample of 129 soccer penalty shootouts from various seasons in ten different tournaments that teams kicking first win significantly more often than teams kicking second by a margin of 21 percentage points. Collecting data for 470 shootouts, including all of APH's shootouts, we cannot replicate their result. Teams kicking first win 53.4% of shootouts, which is not significantly different from the a priori expected 50%. Our finding implies that (1) APH's results are not generally robust; (2) using selective subsamples without a coherent criterion for data inclusion might lead to non-representative results.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. in its series University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series with number 015.
Date of creation: 19 Sep 2010
Date of revision:
Postal: Helen Chapman, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
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NajEcon Working Paper Reviews
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- Steven D. Levitt & John A. List & David H. Reiley, Jr., 2009. "What Happens in the Field Stays in the Field: Exploring Whether Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments," NBER Working Papers 15609, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Artefactual Field Experiments
00091, The Field Experiments Website.
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