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Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue

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  • Rangan Gupta

    (University of Connecticut and University of Pretoria)

Abstract

Using a pure-exchange overlapping generations model, characterized with tax evasion and information asymmetry between the government (the social planner) and the financial intermediaries, we try and seek for the optimal tax and seigniorage plans, derived from the welfare maximizing objective of the social planner. We show that irrespective of whether the economy is characterized by tax evasion, or asymmetric information, a benevolent social planner, maximizing welfare and simultaneously financing the budget constraint, should optimally rely on explicit rather than implicit taxation.

Suggested Citation

  • Rangan Gupta, 2005. "Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue," Working papers 2005-33, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2005-33
    Note: This is a revised version of the fourth chapter of my dissertation at the University of Connecticut. I am particularly grateful to my advisors Christian Zimmermann and Dhammika Dharmapala for many helpful comments and discussions. All remaining errors are mine.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Friedrich Schneider & Robert Klinglmair, 2004. "Shadow economies around the world: what do we know?," Economics working papers 2004-03, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    2. Schneider, Friedrich, 2005. "Shadow economies around the world: what do we really know?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 598-642, September.
    3. Giovannini, Alberto & de Melo, Martha, 1993. "Government Revenue from Financial Repression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 953-963, September.
    4. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    5. Gray, Jo Anna & Wu, Ying, 1995. "On equilibrium credit rationing and interest rates," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 405-420.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cerqueti, Roy & Coppier, Raffaella, 2011. "Economic growth, corruption and tax evasion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 489-500, January.
    2. Rangan Gupta & Emmanuel Ziramba, 2008. "Costly Tax Enforcement and Financial Repression," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 37(2), pages 141-154, July.
    3. Rangan Gupta & Emmanuel Ziramba, 2009. "Tax evasion and financial repression: a reconsideration using endogenous growth models," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 36(6), pages 660-674, October.
    4. Gupta, Rangan, 2008. "Tax evasion and financial repression," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 60(6), pages 517-535.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax evasion; Information Asymmetry in Financial Markets;

    JEL classification:

    • E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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