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Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An Update and Additional Results." Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody. July 2000.Abstract C00-113 "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts

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Petra M. Geraats.
Abstract

This paper updates earlier findings concerning the impact of collective-action clauses on borrowing costs. It has been argued that only in recent quarters have investors focused on the presence of these provisions, and that, given the international financial institutions' newfound resolve to "bail in" investors, they now regard these clauses with trepidation. Extending our data to 1999, we find no evidence of such changes but, rather, the same pattern as before: collective-action clauses raise costs of borrowing for low-rated issuers but reduce them for issuers with high credit ratings. We drop a special case -- Israel -- and show that this has no impact on the results. And we show that the same results hold for sovereign borrowers alone. We argue that these results should reassure those who regard collective action clauses as an important element in the campaign to strengthen the international financial architecture.

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Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers with number C00-114.

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Date of creation: 01 Jul 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbcd:c00-114

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  1. Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, 2000. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?," NBER Working Papers 7458, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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