Permanent uncertainty, employment protection, and firms'location
AbstractIt is often argued that firms need flexibility in order to better face demand uncertainty. As employment protection legislation (EPL) impacts the cost of volume adjustments available to firms, it constrains the volume flexibility that they can achieve. Weakening EPL might thus be thought of as a desirable policy, in particular for when firms are deciding where to locate. On the other hand, it is well known that in an oligopolistic setting, flexibility is not necessarily an advantage. The aim of this paper is to analyze the consequences that different EPL regimes may have on firms' location decisions. It shows that the country characterized by the strongest EPL can nevertheless attract firms under demand uncertainty (either in an agglomeration equilibrium, or in a dispersion equilibrium), and highlights the respective and combined roles played by trade costs and strategic interaction. Moreover, it shows that if firms compete in prices, they will never agglomerate in the country with the lowest EPL.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) with number 201240.
Date of creation: Nov 2012
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F16 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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