To Sponsor or Not to Sponsor: Sponsored Search Auctions with Organic Links
AbstractIn 2010 sponsored search advertisements generated over $12 billion in revenue for search engines in the US market and accounted for 46% of online advertising revenue. A substantial portion of this revenue was generated by the sale of search keywords using an auction mechanism. We analyze a game-theoretic model to understand the interplay between organic and sponsored links in keyword auctions. Our model allows both the relevance of the advertising firm as well as the position of its sponsored link to impact click-through-rates. Our results demonstrate how the presence of organic links (links generated by the search engine algorithm) may lead to either more or less aggressive bidding for sponsored link positions depending on consumer attitudes toward sponsored links and the extent to which sponsored and organic links are complements or substitutes. In contrast to equilibrium results in existing literature, the rm with the highest value per click does not necessarily win the first spot in the sponsored search listings. It also may be optimal for a firm to bid an amount greater than the expected value (or sale) from a click.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) with number 201207.
Date of creation: Jan 2012
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Postal: CREM (UMR CNRS 6211) - Faculty of Economics, 7 place Hoche, 35065 Rennes Cedex - France
Other versions of this item:
- Michael Arnold & Eric Darmon & Thierry Penard, 2012. "To Sponsor or not to Sponsor: Sponsored Search Auctions with Organic Links," Working Papers 12-04, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
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- Zsolt Katona & Miklos Sarvary, 2010. "The Race for Sponsored Links: Bidding Patterns for Search Advertising," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(2), pages 199-215, 03-04.
- Lesley Chiou & Catherine Tucker, 2012. "How Does the Use of Trademarks by Third-Party Sellers Affect Online Search?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 819-837, September.
- Taylor, Greg, 2011. "The informativeness of on-line advertising," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 668-677.
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