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Using behavioural economics to understand tax compliance

Author

Listed:
  • James Alm

    (Tulane University)

  • Matthias Kasper

    (University of Vienna)

Abstract

‘Behavioural economics’, or the application of methods and evidence from other social sciences to economics, has increased greatly in significance and use in the last two decades. In this paper we discuss the basic elements of behavioural economics. We then assess the applications of behavioural economics to the analysis of tax compliance. Our central conclusion is that many, perhaps most, of the recent insights on what motivates tax compliance have flowed directly from behavioural economics. We conclude with suggestions on – and predictions of – directions in which future applications should prove useful.

Suggested Citation

  • James Alm & Matthias Kasper, 2022. "Using behavioural economics to understand tax compliance," Working Papers 2207, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:tul:wpaper:2207
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    File URL: http://repec.tulane.edu/RePEc/pdf/tul2207.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James Alm & Carolyn J. Bourdeaux, 2013. "Applying Behavioral Economics to the Public Sector," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 206(3), pages 91-134, September.
    2. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2010. "The New Dynamic Public Finance," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9222.
    3. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    5. Matthias Kasper & James Alm, 2022. "Does the Bomb-crater Effect Really Exist? Evidence from the Laboratory," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 78(1-2), pages 87-111.
    6. Joel Slemrod & Caroline Weber, 2012. "Evidence of the invisible: toward a credibility revolution in the empirical analysis of tax evasion and the informal economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(1), pages 25-53, February.
    7. Agnar Sandmo, 2012. "An evasive topic: theorizing about the hidden economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(1), pages 5-24, February.
    8. Benno Torgler, 2016. "Tax Compliance and Data: What Is Available and What Is Needed," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 49(3), pages 352-364, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. James Alm & Lilith Burgstaller & Arrita Domi & Amanda März & Matthias Kasper, 2023. "Nudges, Boosts, and Sludge: Using New Behavioral Approaches to Improve Tax Compliance," Economies, MDPI, vol. 11(9), pages 1-22, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Behavioural economics; tax compliance; expected utility theory; non-expected utility theory; social interactions theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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