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Matching Unskilled/Skilled Workers to Firms Facing Budget Constraints

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  • Ahmadzadeh, Amirreza
  • Kamali-Shahdadi, Behrang

Abstract

We study a matching model in which firms face budget constraints. If the pro-duction function only depends on a firm’s technology, a weak stable matching always exists; furthermore, when a strong stable matching does not exist, there is a nearby budget vector for firms such that a strong stable matching exists for the problem with perturbed budgets. If the production function is multiplicative, one can reach a strong stable matching by changing the budget of firms such that the total budget remains the same and each firm’s budget change is bounded by the value of at most one worker for that firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahmadzadeh, Amirreza & Kamali-Shahdadi, Behrang, 2023. "Matching Unskilled/Skilled Workers to Firms Facing Budget Constraints," TSE Working Papers 23-1446, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:128153
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching Theory; Market Design; Labor Market;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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