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Direct Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Majority-Proofness

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Author Info
Hitoshi Matsushima (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

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Abstract

We investigate implementation in the complete information environments, where a social choice function is defined as a mapping from states to lotteries, and there exist four or more agents. We assume that for every agent, any pair of distinct states induces distinct strict preference orderings over all pure alternatives. In contrast to the previous works, we construct only direct mechanisms. Without any help of mechanism complexity, we can show that every social choice function is virtually implementable, provided that the set of states is restricted in ways that there always exist a majority of agents who dislike a particular agentfs dictatorial choice the worst.

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File URL: http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/dp/2002/2002cf149.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-149.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2002
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Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf149

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  1. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-148, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jackson, Matthew O, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated.Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(4), pages 757-75, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-147, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  4. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 997-1021, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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