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How to Regulate Vertical Market Structure in Network Industries

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Author Info
Stefan Buehler () (Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich)

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the equilibrium outcomes in a network industry under different vertical market structures. In this industry, an upstream monopolist operates a network used as an input to produce horizontally differentiated final products that are imperfect substitutes. Three potential drawbacks of market structure regulation are analyzed: (i) double marginalization, (ii) underinvestment, and (iii) vertical foreclosure. We explore the conditions under which these effects emerge and discuss when the breakup of an integrated network monopolist is adequate.

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File URL: http://www.soi.uzh.ch/research/wp/1997-2002/wp0102.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2001
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute in its series Working Papers with number 0102.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in German Economic Review 6(2), 2005, pages 205-228
Handle: RePEc:soz:wpaper:0102

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Related research
Keywords: access pricing investment vertical foreclosure

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Lee, Sang Hyup & Hamilton, Jonathan H, 1999. "Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 223-48, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Russell Pittman, 2001. "Vertical Restructuring of the Infrastructure Sectors of Transition Economies," Industrial Organization 0111002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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