Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Monetary Policy Rules Work and Discretion Doesn’t: A Tale of Two Eras

Contents:

Author Info

  • John B. Taylor

    ()
    (Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research)

Abstract

This lecture examines monetary policy during the past three decades. It documents two contrasting eras: first a Rules-Based Era from 1985 to 2003 and second an Ad Hoc Era from 2003 to the present. During the Rules-Based Era, monetary policy, in broad terms, followed a predictable systemic approach, and economic performance was generally good. During the Ad Hoc Era monetary policy is best described as a “discretion of authorities” approach, and economic performance was decidedly poor. By considering alternative explanations of this policy-performance correlation and examining corroborating evidence, the paper concludes that rules based policies have clear advantages over discretion.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/repec/sip/11-019.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research in its series Discussion Papers with number 11-019.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sip:dpaper:11-019

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 366 Galvez Street, Stanford, California 94305-6015
Phone: (650) 725-1874
Fax: (650) 723-8611
Web page: http://siepr.stanford.edu
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Rudiger Ahrend & Boris Cournède & Robert W.R. Price, 2008. "Monetary Policy, Market Excesses and Financial Turmoil," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 597, OECD Publishing.
  2. George A. Kahn, 2010. "Taylor rule deviations and financial imbalances," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q II, pages 63-99.
  3. Marek Jarocinski & Frank R. Smets, 2008. "House prices and the stance of monetary policy," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 339-366.
  4. Ahrend, Rudiger, 2008. "Monetary Ease: A Factor behind Financial Crises? Some Evidence from OECD Countries," Economics Discussion Papers 2008-44, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  5. Johannes C. Stroebel & John B. Taylor, 2009. "Estimated Impact of the Fed’s Mortgage-Backed Securities Purchase Program," NBER Working Papers 15626, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Ehsan U. Choudhri & Lawrence L. Schembri, 2013. "A Tale of Two Countries and Two Booms, Canada and the United States in the 1920s and the 2000s: The Roles of Monetary and Financial Stability Policies," Working Paper Series 44_13, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
  2. Arizmendi, Luis-Felipe, 2013. "An extended model of currency options applicable as policy tool for central banks with inflation targeting and dollarized economies," MPRA Paper 52880, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Apr 2013.
  3. Mohammed Dore & Roelof Makken & Erik Eastman, 2013. "The Monetary Transmission Mechanism, Non-residential Fixed Investment and Housing," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 41(3), pages 215-224, September.
  4. Frank A.G. den Butter & Mathieu L.L. Segers, 2014. "Prospects for an EMU between Federalism and Nationalism," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-008/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
  5. Miguel Casares & Jesús Vázquez, 2012. "The Great Moderation of Inflation: a structural analysis of recent U.S. monetary business cycles," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 1215, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
  6. Julio J. Rotemberg, 2013. "Shifts in US Federal Reserve Goals and Tactics for Monetary Policy: A Role for Penitence?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 65-86, Fall.
  7. Otmar Issing, 2013. "A New Paradigm for Monetary Policy?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 273-288, 06.
  8. John B. Taylor, 2013. "The Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence Versus Policy Rules," Discussion Papers 12-009, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sip:dpaper:11-019. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne Shor).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.