Pay, Risk, and Productivity. The Case of Finland, 1980-1996
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy in its series Discussion Papers with number 743.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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