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Wage dynamics in long-term contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Philip Jung

    (Bonn University)

  • Moritz Kuhn

    (University of Bonn)

Abstract

We prove existence, monotonicity and differentiability of firm profits and provide first-order conditions that characterize the properties of the optimal contract. We demonstrate how the shape of the contract depends on the persistence and variance of the productivity process, on worker and firm risk, and on non-pecuniary utility components.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Jung & Moritz Kuhn, 2013. "Wage dynamics in long-term contracts," 2013 Meeting Papers 556, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed013:556
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Philip Jung & Moritz Kuhn, 2019. "Earnings Losses and Labor Mobility Over the Life Cycle," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 678-724.
    2. Ken Burdett & Melvyn Coles, 2003. "Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(5), pages 1377-1404, September.
    3. Krueger, Dirk & Uhlig, Harald, 2006. "Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1661-1691, October.
    4. Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2007. "Limited Commitment Models Of The Labour Market," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 54(5), pages 750-773, November.
    5. Shouyong Shi, 2009. "Directed Search for Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 561-584, March.
    6. Peter Rupert, 2004. "Wage and employer changes over the life cycle," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Apr.
    7. Stephen E. Spear & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617.
    8. Lagakos, David & Ordoñez, Guillermo L., 2011. "Which workers get insurance within the firm?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(6), pages 632-645.
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    Cited by:

    1. Philip Jung & Moritz Kuhn, 2019. "Earnings Losses and Labor Mobility Over the Life Cycle," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 678-724.

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