Transparency and Costly Information Acquisition
AbstractI study the choice of economic transparency in a heterogeneous-information model where agents must pay a cost to observe the announcements of an information authority. The authority chooses transparency by selecting the number of signals regarding an aggregate state to make public, and agents respond by choosing how many of those signals to observe. I show that, when agents seek to coordinate their actions, the amount of information actually gathered by agents is non-monotonic in the transparency of the authority. The optimal degree of transparency is always interior and depends on the strength of complementarities in the economy. Transparency is distinguished from the precision of the authority's own information and the ``quality" of its communications; increases in these are shown to be welfare improving under plausible conditions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2011 Meeting Papers with number 1221.
Date of creation: 2011
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
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