Bilateral Matching and Latin Squares
AbstractWe develop a general procedure to construct pairwise meeting processes characterized by two features. First, in each period the process maximizes the number of matches in the population. Second, over time agents meet everybody else exactly once. We call this type of meetings "absolute strangers." Our methodological contribution to economics is to offer a simple procedure to construct a type of decentralized trading environments usually employed in both theoretical and experimental economics. In particular, we demonstrate how to make use of the mathematics of Latin Squares to enrich the modeling of matching economies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1189.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2006
Date of revision:
Latin squares ; Matching models ; Spatial interactions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- E00 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-07-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2006-07-15 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MAC-2006-07-15 (Macroeconomics)
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