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Emergence of Endogenous Legal Institutions: Property Rights and Community Governance in the Italian Alps'

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Author Info
Casari, Marco

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Abstract

This paper studies the legal institutions set up by communities in the Italian Alps in the 13th – 19th century to manage their common pastures and forests. Over time, private-order institutions in the form of charters replaced informal arrangements sustained by the long-run interaction among villagers. Although costly to run, the charters accomplished several tasks that increased resource use efficiency. We present an empirical analysis of institutional choice of about two hundred communities and show that relative efficiency was an important factor in the selection of a governance regime.

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File URL: http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/programs/phd/Working-paper-series/Year-2006/1182.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1182.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1182

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Related research
Keywords: property rights ; transaction costs ; community enforcement ; sanctions ; natural resources ; common property;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-28.

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