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Dynamic Bargaining over Redistribution with Endogenous Distribution of Political Power

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  • Saito, Yuta

Abstract

This paper investigates a dynamic capital taxation (and redistribution) problem with an endogenous political power balance. It is shown that the current redistribution, which reduces the future inequality, decreases the future needs for redistribution if the bargaining power is (at least partly) endogenized.

Suggested Citation

  • Saito, Yuta, 2016. "Dynamic Bargaining over Redistribution with Endogenous Distribution of Political Power," MPRA Paper 71130, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:71130
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71130/1/MPRA_paper_71130.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    2. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, 2013. "A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(5), pages 1851-1886, September.
    3. Alessandro Riboni & Facundo Piguillem, 2011. "Dynamic Bargaining over Redistribution in Legislatures," 2011 Meeting Papers 1320, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Marco Bassetto, 2008. "Political Economy of Taxation in an Overlapping-Generations Economy," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 18-43, January.
    5. Adam Bonica & Nolan McCarty & Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, 2013. "Why Hasn't Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 103-124, Summer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legislative bargaining; Wealth inequality; Redistribution; Capital taxation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

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