Deterrence effects under Twombly: on the costs of increasing pleading standards in litigation
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- Campos, Sergio J. & Cotton, Christopher S. & Li, Cheng, 2015. "Deterrence effects under Twombly: On the costs of increasing pleading standards in litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 61-71.
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- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2016. "How procedures shape substance: Institutional Design and Antitrust Evidentiary Standards," Post-Print hal-01668497, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2018. "How procedures shape substance: institutional design and antitrust evidentiary standards," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01886577, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2016. "How procedures shape substance: Institutional Design and Antitrust Evidentiary Standards," Post-Print hal-01668528, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2018. "How procedures shape substance: institutional design and antitrust evidentiary standards," Post-Print halshs-01886577, HAL.
- Chulyoung Kim, 2018.
"Judge’s gate-keeping power and deterrence of negligent acts: an economic analysis of Twombly and Iqbal,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 39-66, August.
- Kim, Chulyoung, 2015. "Judge's Gate-Keeping Power and Deterrence of Negligent Acts: An Economic Analysis of Twombly and Iqbal," MPRA Paper 69836, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
Judicial procedure; pleading; litigation; deterrence;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2015-07-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAW-2015-07-18 (Law and Economics)
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