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省直管县改革的扩权模式选择：全面直管还是省内单列？
[Delegation Pattern of “Province Administrating County”: Overall Reform or County Economic Power Expansion?]

Author

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  • gong, rukai
  • yao, dongmin

Abstract

从地方政府发现和利用经济发展机会的视角出发，考察目前省直管县试点改革中出现的主要扩权模式，提出并论证“省直管县改革是全面直管与省内单列的扩权模式选择”的议题。在动态博弈的框架下分析代理人（县级政府）的最优努力水平和委托人（省级政府）的期望效用，通过对不同扩权模式下省级政府的期望效用进行比较，总结出省直管县改革扩权模式选择的经济学逻辑；并进一步地考虑县级政府之间的异质性和经济关联对省直管县扩权模式选择的影响，总结出省直管县改革扩权模式选择的经济学逻辑。得出如下政策启示：省级政府在进行扩权模式选择时，需因地制宜，综合考虑经济发展机会的期望收益、县级政府之间的异质性和经济关联，以期本文的研究结果为目前正在推行的省直管县改革实践提供理论借鉴。

Suggested Citation

  • gong, rukai & yao, dongmin, 2014. "省直管县改革的扩权模式选择：全面直管还是省内单列？ [Delegation Pattern of “Province Administrating County”: Overall Reform or County Economic Power Expansion?]," MPRA Paper 52997, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:52997
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    省直管县，全面直管，省内单列，经济发展机会;

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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