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Do mergers create or destroy value? Evidence from unsuccessful mergers

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Author Info
Cole, Rebel
Fatemi, Ali
Vu, Joseph

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Abstract

In this study, we examine unsuccessful takeover attempts for new evidence on whether mergers create or destroy value for acquirers and targets. We contribute to the literature in three important areas. First, we contribute to the literature on signaling by investigating whether a takeover attempt signals investors about the quality of firm management as well as the quality of the specific firm investment under consideration. We find that bid announcement returns are partially, but not completely, reversed by termination announcement returns, evidence that the merger proposal itself contains information about the value of the bidding firm. Second, we contribute to the literature on the value of diversification by examining how merger bids and terminations affect the relative values of bidders attempting diversifying and focusing takeovers. Our evidence enables us to differentiate between the synergistic and agency views of mergers. We find significant differences in the responses of firms attempting focusing versus diversifying mergers. The reversal of bid announcement returns by termination announcement returns is significantly different for focusing and diversifying firms. There is no reversal for diversifying firms while there is a partial reversal for focusing firms. This provides evidence in support of both the synergistic and agency views of mergers. Synergies are evident in focusing mergers while agency costs are evident in diversifying mergers. Third, we contribute to the literature on the valuation effects of mergers by using data from the 1991-2000 period to re-examine the important topic of who wins and who loses when mergers are terminated. Previous research examining terminated mergers has relied exclusively upon data from the 1980s.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 4717.

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Date of creation: Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4717

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Related research
Keywords: acquisition diversification focus merger signaling takeover terminated merger

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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  1. Lewellen, Wilbur G, 1971. "A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 26(2), pages 521-37, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bradley, Michael & Desai, Anand & Kim, E. Han, 1988. "Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 3-40, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Denis, David J. & Serrano, Jan M., 1996. "Active investors and management turnover following unsuccessful control contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 239-266, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1990. " Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 31-48, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Bradley, Michael, 1980. "Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 345-76, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Healy, Paul M. & Palepu, Krishna G. & Ruback, Richard S., 1992. "Does corporate performance improve after mergers?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 135-175, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. DeLong, Gayle L., 2001. "Stockholder gains from focusing versus diversifying bank mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 221-252, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Davidson, Wallace N, III & Dutia, Dipa & Cheng, Louis, 1989. " A Re-examination of the Market Reaction to Failed Mergers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(4), pages 1077-83, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Dodd, Peter & Ruback, Richard, 1977. "Tender offers and stockholder returns : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 351-373, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Comment, Robert & Jarrell, Gregg A., 1995. "Corporate focus and stock returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 67-87, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, 1981. "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 605-617, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Berger, Philip G. & Ofek, Eli, 1995. "Diversification's effect on firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 39-65, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Maquieira, Carlos P. & Megginson, William L. & Nail, Lance, 1998. "Wealth creation versus wealth redistributions in pure stock-for-stock mergers1," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 3-33, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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