Mathematical structures of simple voting games
AbstractWe address simple voting games (SVGs) as mathematical objects in their own right, and study structures made up of these objects, rather than focusing on SVGs primarily as co-operative games. To this end it is convenient to employ the conceptual framework and language of category theory. This enables us to uncover the underlying unity of the basic operations involving SVGs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 43939.
Date of creation: 11 Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Simple games; Lattice of simple games; Category;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-01-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-01-26 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2013-01-26 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2013-01-26 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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