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Moral hazard in a voluntary deposit insurance system: Revisited

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Author Info
Camacho-Gutiérrez, Pablo
González-Cantú, Vanessa M.

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Abstract

This paper extends Wheelock and Kumbhakar’s (1995) test for moral hazard in the Kansas deposit insurance system (1910-1920). This paper tests and finds evidence of omitted bank-specific effects. Estimates in Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1995), as a result, are biased. This paper introduces unobserved individual heterogeneity to the test for moral hazard, corrects their estimates, and finds more evidence of moral hazard in the Kansas deposit insurance system.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3909/
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 3909.

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Date of creation: 31 May 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:3909

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Related research
Keywords: Deposit insurance moral hazard test panel data random and fixed effects.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models
G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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  1. Wheelock, David C & Kumbhakar, Subal C, 1995. "Which Banks Choose Deposit Insurance? Evidence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Insurance System," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(1), pages 186-201, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Wheelock, David C & Wilson, Paul W, 1995. "Explaining Bank Failures: Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Efficiency," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 77(4), pages 689-700, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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