IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/36057.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Are financial analysts of IPO firms under pressure: the European evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Boissin, Romain

Abstract

Long run returns of IPO firms’ recommendations in Europe reveal possible conflicts of interest and pressures faced by financial analysts over the 1991-2005 period. Nevertheless, recent European legislations about investment research have led to better long run performance of IPO firms’ recommendations issued by affiliated analysts over the 2001-2005 period. Findings reveal that market participants do not fully incorporate the perceived value of recommendations. Indeed, difference between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations is statistically significant over one, three or five year horizon. The timing of recommendations specifies that investors pay more attention to affiliated analysts’ recommendations made later in the aftermarket. This result could suggest that the later is the recommendation made in the IPO aftermarket the weaker is the pressure faced by affiliated analysts.

Suggested Citation

  • Boissin, Romain, 2012. "Are financial analysts of IPO firms under pressure: the European evidence," MPRA Paper 36057, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:36057
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36057/1/MPRA_paper_36057.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brav, Alon & Gompers, Paul A, 1997. "Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Underperformance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed Companies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 1791-1821, December.
    2. Annemarie Sapusek, 2000. "Benchmark-Sensitivity Of Ipo Long-Run Performance: An Empirical Study For Germany," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 52(4), pages 374-405, October.
    3. Barber, Brad M. & Lehavy, Reuven & Trueman, Brett, 2007. "Comparing the stock recommendation performance of investment banks and independent research firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 490-517, August.
    4. Patricia C. O'Brien & Maureen F. Mcnichols & Lin Hsiou‐Wei, 2005. "Analyst Impartiality and Investment Banking Relationships," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(4), pages 623-650, September.
    5. Ohad Kadan & Leonardo Madureira & Rong Wang & Tzachi Zach, 2009. "Conflicts of Interest and Stock Recommendations: The Effects of the Global Settlement and Related Regulations," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(10), pages 4189-4217, October.
    6. Fama, Eugene F. & French, Kenneth R., 1993. "Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 3-56, February.
    7. Narasimhan Jegadeesh & Joonghyuk Kim & Susan D. Krische & Charles M. C. Lee, 2004. "Analyzing the Analysts: When Do Recommendations Add Value?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(3), pages 1083-1124, June.
    8. Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-686.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thabang Mokoaleli‐Mokoteli & Richard J. Taffler & Vineet Agarwal, 2009. "Behavioural Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Analyst Stock Recommendations," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3‐4), pages 384-418, April.
    2. Thabang Mokoaleli-Mokoteli & Richard J. Taffler & Vineet Agarwal, 2009. "Behavioural Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Analyst Stock Recommendations," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3-4), pages 384-418.
    3. Andreas Charitou & Irene Karamanou, 2020. "Sleeping with the enemy: should investment banks be allowed to engage in prop trading?," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 513-557, June.
    4. Vesa Pursiainen, 2022. "Cultural Biases in Equity Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 163-211, February.
    5. Juyoun Ryoo & Cheolwoo Lee & Jin Q Jeon, 2020. "Sustainability of Analyst Recommendations in Multiple Lead Underwriter IPOs," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(5), pages 1-36, March.
    6. Lim, Youngdeok & Kim, Hyungtae, 2019. "Market reaction to optimistic bias in the recommendations of chaebol-affiliated analysts," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 224-242.
    7. Mola, Simona & Guidolin, Massimo, 2009. "Affiliated mutual funds and analyst optimism," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 108-137, July.
    8. Galanti, Sébastien & Vaubourg, Anne Gaël, 2017. "Optimism bias in financial analysts' earnings forecasts: Do commissions sharing agreements reduce conflicts of interest?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 325-337.
    9. Chen Su, 2023. "The price impact of analyst revisions and the state of the economy: Evidence around the world," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 887-930, November.
    10. Jeffrey Hobbs & Vivek Singh, 2015. "A comparison of buy‐side and sell‐side analysts," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 24(1), pages 42-51, January.
    11. Cheolwoo Lee, 2013. "Analyst firm parent–subsidiary relationship and conflict of interest: evidence from IPO recommendations," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 53(3), pages 763-789, September.
    12. Savor, Pavel G., 2012. "Stock returns after major price shocks: The impact of information," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 635-659.
    13. Johan Sulaeman & Kelsey D. Wei, 2019. "Sell-Side Analysts and Stock Mispricing: Evidence from Mutual Fund Flow-Driven Trading Pressure," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(11), pages 5427-5448, November.
    14. Mark T. Bradshaw & Alan G. Huang & Hongping Tan, 2019. "The Effects of Analyst‐Country Institutions on Biased Research: Evidence from Target Prices," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 85-120, March.
    15. Daniel Arand & Alexander G. Kerl, 2015. "Sell†Side Analyst Research and Reported Conflicts of Interest," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 21(1), pages 20-51, January.
    16. Dambra, Michael & Field, Laura Casares & Gustafson, Matthew T. & Pisciotta, Kevin, 2018. "The consequences to analyst involvement in the IPO process: Evidence surrounding the JOBS Act," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 302-330.
    17. Boris Groysberg & Paul Healy & George Serafeim & Devin Shanthikumar, 2013. "The Stock Selection and Performance of Buy-Side Analysts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(5), pages 1062-1075, May.
    18. Gu, Zhaoyang & Xue, Jian, 2008. "The superiority and disciplining role of independent analysts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 289-316, August.
    19. Hobbs, Jeffrey & Singh, Vivek, 2015. "A comparison of buy-side and sell-side analysts," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 42-51.
    20. Li, Fengfei & Lin, Chen & Lin, Tse-Chun, 2021. "Salient anchor and analyst recommendation downgrade," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Initial Public Offering; conflicts of interest; financial analysts; long run performance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:36057. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.