The Google Book search settlement: A law and economics analysis
AbstractBeginning in December 2004 Google has pursued a new project to create a book search engine (Google Book Search). The project has released a storm of controversy around the globe. While the supporters of Google Book Search conceive the project as a first reasonable step towards unlimited access to knowledge in the information age, its opponents fear profound negative effects due to an erosion of copyright law. Our law and economics analysis of the Book Search Project suggests that – from a copyright perspective – the proposed settlement may be beneficial to right holders, consumers, and Google. For instance, it may provide a solution to the still unsolved dilemma of orphan works. From a competition policy perspective, we stress the important aspect that Google’s pricing algorithm for orphan and unclaimed works effectively replicates a competitive Nash-Bertrand market outcome under post-settlement, third-party oversight.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 35705.
Date of creation: 15 Jun 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues 1.8(2011): pp. 7-50
Book Rights Registry; Competition Policy; Copyright; Fair Use; Google Book Search; Library Program; Orphan Works;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property Rights
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-01-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-01-10 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CUL-2012-01-10 (Cultural Economics)
- NEP-ICT-2012-01-10 (Information & Communication Technologies)
- NEP-IPR-2012-01-10 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAW-2012-01-10 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2012-01-10 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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