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Inequality, Uncertainty, and Redistribution

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  • Machado, Fabiana

Abstract

For centuries it has been believed that the extension of the franchise in unequal societies would lead to relatively high levels of redistribution. According to international rankings, how- ever, among the fourteen most unequal countries in the world, nine have been democratic for at least the past fourteen years. A prerequisite for the adoption of redistributive policies is that there be elected representatives who are either committed to or who have an incentive to advocate for such policies. The prospects of such an outcome depend not only on candidates personal policy preferences and motivations, but also how they are perceived by voters. One important feature shared by highly unequal democracies is that they tend to be relatively young, with many new parties and candidates in the political scene. This means elections occur under a high degree of uncertainty about critical information voters need to chose their delegates. Thus, in this paper I develop a model of elections as a game of incomplete information to explore how uncertainty, candidates’ motivation (policy vs. office), and beliefs about their ideological inclinations affect what policy interests are likely to be represented in the political process. I explore the model’s assumptions and outcomes empirically using individual level data for each presidential election in Brazil since democratization.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 35665.

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Date of creation: 11 Sep 2011
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:35665

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Keywords: Elections; Redistribution; Inequality; Uncertainty;

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  1. Casamatta, Georges & De Donder, Philippe, 2003. "On the Influence of Extreme Parties in Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3885, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
  3. Duggan, John & Fey, Mark, 2005. "Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 490-522, May.
  4. John Duggan, 2000. "Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 109-135, 07.
  5. Jim Engle-Warnick & Javier Escobal & Sonia Laszlo, 2006. "The Effect of an Additional Alternative on Measured Risk Preferences in a Laboratory Experiment in Peru," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 2006s-06, CIRANO.
  6. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October.
  7. Catherine Eckel & Cathleen Johnson & Claude Montmarquette, 2004. "Saving Decisions of the Working Poor: Short-and Long-Term Horizons," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 2004s-45, CIRANO.
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Cited by:
  1. Martín Ardanaz & Carlos Scartascini, 2011. "Why Don't We Tax the Rich? Inequality, Legislative Malapportionment, and Personal Income Taxation around the World," IDB Publications 65178, Inter-American Development Bank.

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