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Economical preconditions of functioning of independent boards of directors in view of neoclassical economical theory

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Abstract

The article examines analytically economical preconditions and motivation of economical agents to use independent boards in corporate government of a firm. Behavior of economical agents (shareholders and management of a firm) is analyzed in view of neoclassical economical theory. In survey author analyzes behavior of shareholders and makes conclusion that for shareholder the most efficient way to minimize transactional costs while being invested in stocks of a company is to delegate some functions (related with control and increasing shareholders value) in independent board of directors.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrey, Rudkov, 2011. "Economical preconditions of functioning of independent boards of directors in view of neoclassical economical theory," MPRA Paper 32855, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32855
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dahlman, Carl J, 1979. "The Problem of Externality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 141-162, April.
    2. Holderness, Clifford G. & Sheehan, Dennis P., 1988. "The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations : An exploratory analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 317-346, January.
    3. David Yermack, 2006. "Board Members and Company Value," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 20(1), pages 33-47, April.
    4. Taylor, Frederick Winslow, 1911. "The Principles of Scientific Management," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number taylor1911.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    transactional costs; corporate government; neoclassical theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration
    • A1 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • B13 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Wicksellian)
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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