Corporate governance in the UK : contrasted with the US system
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich in its journal CESifo Forum.
Volume (Year): 3 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Corporate Governance; Vergleich; Großbritannien; Vereinigte Staaten; Comparison; United Kingdom; United states;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- O57 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Comparative Studies of Countries
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