A tale of three countries, dispersed ownership and greater risk taking levels by management: risk monitoring tools in bank regulation and supervision – developments since the collapse of Barings Plc (re – visited)
AbstractThis paper is aimed at explaining why higher concentrations of the ownership of large firms do not necessarily and automatically facilitate lower risk taking levels – where there is scope for the abuse of powers. As well as illustrating why effective corporate governance systems are essential in facilitating high levels of monitoring, accountability and disclosure, the paper also highlights why a consideration of the costs of ownership concentration and its benefits, is required in determining whether corporate governance systems will be effective or not.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 28131.
Date of creation: 14 Jan 2011
Date of revision:
corporate governance; ownership structures; banks; risk; regulation; monitoring; disclosure; accountability; liquidity; internal controls;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2011-01-30 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-01-30 (Regulation)
- NEP-RMG-2011-01-30 (Risk Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jeremy Edwards & Marcus Nibler, 2000. "Corporate governance in Germany: the role of banks and ownership concentration," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 15(31), pages 237-267, October.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.