Economic Foundation of Dictatorship in Resource Exporting Economies
AbstractThis paper explains the lack of democratization in resource exporting countries using a two period resource extraction model. There are two classes of agents: elite who own capital and natural resources and citizens who own labor. The elite announce, in the rst period, their plans for resource extraction and investment in the economy. Citizens, in the second period, decide whether to conduct a revolution against elite to capture their share of rents from un-extracted resources. Government policies are designed to ensure that the elite remain in power and that citizens do not have the incentive to revolt. These policies subsidize extraction and investment during the rst period. The extraction subsidy reduces the benet of revolution while the investment subsidy increases its cost. On the other hand, policies in the democracy case are not constrained by the revolution threat and represent the median voter preferences. The resource is over extracted in the non-democratic case compared to the democratic case. Also, investment in the non-resource sector is lower. The important nding of the model is that extraction path goes against price signals; rst period extraction increases with the increase of the resource price in the second period. Non-Democratic institution is the rational choice of the elite even with the costly policies to prevent a revolution.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 27318.
Date of creation: May 2010
Date of revision:
resource curse; political transition; institutions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
- Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1999.
"A Theory of Political Transitions,"
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
2277, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September.
- Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson, 1999. "A Theory of Political Transitions," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 99-26, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Francesco Caselli & Tom Cunningham, 2009.
"Leader Behavior and the Natural Resource Curse,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp0913, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002.
"Institutions and the resource curse,"
GE, Growth, Math methods, EconWPA
- Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar, 2003. "Institutions and the resource curse," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics 29/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Institutions and the resource curse," Development and Comp Systems 0210003, EconWPA.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2004. "Institutions and the Resource Curse," DEGIT Conference Papers, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade c009_012, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Hodler, Roland, 2006.
"The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1367-1386, August.
- Roland Hodler, 2004. "The Curse of Natural Resources in Fractionalized Countries," Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft dp0404, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik & Thierry Verdier, 2003.
"Politcal Foundations of the Resource Curse,"
DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supÃ©rieure)
2003-33, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Robinson, James A & Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, Thierry, 2002. "Political Foundations of the Resource Curse," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3422, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Christa N. Brunnschweiler & Erwin H. Bulte, 2006.
"The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of Paradoxes and Red Herrings,"
CER-ETH Economics working paper series
06/61, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Brunnschweiler, Christa N. & Bulte, Erwin H., 2008. "The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes and red herrings," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 248-264, May.
- Baland, Jean-Marie & Francois, Patrick, 2000. "Rent-seeking and resource booms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 527-542, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.