Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Free Ride, Take it Easy: An Empirical Analysis of Adverse Incentives Caused by Revenue Sharing

Contents:

Author Info

  • Daniel, Rascher
  • Matt, Brown
  • Mark, Nagel
  • Chad, McEvoy

Abstract

A fundamental belief in professional sport leagues is that competitive balance is needed to maximize demand and revenues; therefore, leagues have created policies attempting to attain proper competitive balance. Further, research posits that objectives of professional sport teams’ owners include some combination of winning and profit maximization. Although the pursuit of wins is a zero sum game, revenue generation and potential profit making is not. This article focuses upon the National Football League’s potential unintended consequences of creating the incentive for some teams to free ride on the rest of the league’s talent and brand. It examines whether an owner’s objectives to generate increased revenues and profits are potentially enhanced by operating as a continual low-cost provider while making money from the shared revenues and brand value of the league. The present evidence indicates that, overall, being a low-cost provider is more profitable than increasing player salaries in an attempt to win additional games.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25806/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 25806.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:25806

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: free riding; free ride; football; profit maximization; regression; owner incentives;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Scully, Gerald W., 1995. "The Market Structure of Sports," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226743950.
  2. Phillip A. Miller, 2009. "Facility Age and Ownership in Major American Team Sports Leagues: The Effect on Team Franchise Values," International Journal of Sport Finance, Fitness Information Technology, vol. 4(3), pages 176-191, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:25806. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.