Corporate strategies – the institutional approach
AbstractThe present paper introduces a model of corporate strategies, based on institutional theories of the firm and formalized with the concepts of the theory of games. Corporate strategies are balanced outcomes of four social games: capital market, corporate governance, product market and social responsibility. Two empirical applications of the model are then introduced: a qualitative one, consisting in comparative study of strategies deployed by Royal Dutch Shell and Israel Corporation, then a quantitative one, presenting a study of capital accumulation and operational efficiency in 79 companies listed in the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 25190.
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision:
institutional economics; strategy; corporation;
Other versions of this item:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
- D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CSE-2010-09-25 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-MIC-2010-09-25 (Microeconomics)
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