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Oligopoly Model of a Debit Card Network

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Author Info
Manchev, Peter

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Abstract

The paper builds an oligopoly model of a debit card network. It examines the competition between debit card issuers. We show that there is an optimal pricing for the debit card network, which maximizes all issuer's revenues. The paper also shows that establishing a link between debit card networks averages the costs provided that there is no growth in the customer's usage of the networks, resulting from the link.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2460/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2460.

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Date of creation: 28 Jul 2006
Date of revision: 26 Feb 2007
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2460

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Related research
Keywords: debit card payment networks switch fees access pricing

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Joshua Gans & Stephen King, 2003. "The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1069-1069. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Sujit Chakravorti & Roberto Roson, 2006. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Payment Networks," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 5(1), pages 118-143, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Sujit Chakravorti & Alpa Shah, 2001. "A study of the interrelated bilateral transactions in credit card networks," Occasional Paper; Emerging Payments EPS-2001-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Kauko, K., 2000. "The Microeconomics of Innovation: Oligopoly Theoretic Nalyses with Applications to Banking and Patenting," Bank of Finland - Studies in Economics and Finance e18, Bank of Finland. Research Department..
  5. Rochet, Jean Charles & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "Cooperation Among Competitors: The Economics of Credit Card Associations," CEPR Discussion Papers 2101, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-17.

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