This study seeks to explore policy framework on the impact of moral hazard problem in the JFMP in which government, the owner of forest resource, can not legally monitor actions of JFM households, the agent of the programme, who illegally extract timber forest products. Despite much decrease of illegal collection of TFPs after JFM by the JFM households, some poor JFM households have higher incidence in the illegal extraction of TFPs to meet up their minimum subsistence in which law or force can not effectively control the same which might create more adverse effect on the sustainability of forest resource.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
15230.
Find related papers by JEL classification: Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry J08 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics Policies D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounting
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: