In this paper we empirically examine whether public facilities like providing primary school, medical clinics, electricity etc help incumbents to stay in power. Specifically, we analyze the parliamentary election outcomes in 483 constituents in rural India from 1971 to 1991. This study is based on a simple voter model where the voter looks at the supply of public goods provided by the incumbent and then decides whether to re-elect the incumbent. We find empirical evidence that voters do significantly care about educational, electricity and communication facilities, whereas incumbents face defeat if they provide more medical or safe drinking water facilities.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
11536.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects