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Bayesian Persuasion: Reduced Form Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Juuso Toikka

    (University of Pennsylvania)

  • Akhil Vohra

    (University of Cambridge)

  • Rakesh Vohra

    (University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

We introduce reduced form representations of Bayesian persuasion problems where the variables are the probabilities that the receiver takes each of her actions. These are simpler objects than, say, the joint distribution over states and actions in the obedience formulation of the persuasion problem. This can make a difference in computational and analytical tractability which we illustrate with two applications. The first shows that with quadratic receiver payoffs, the worst-case complexity scales with the number of actions and not the number of states. If |A |and |S | denote the number of actions and states respectively, the worst case complexity of the obedience formulation is O(|A |2.5 max{|A |2.5,|S |2.5}). The worst case complexity of the reduced form representation is O(|A |3). In the second application, the reduced form leads to a simple greedy algorithm to determine the maximum value a sender can achieve in any cheap talk equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Juuso Toikka & Akhil Vohra & Rakesh Vohra, 2022. "Bayesian Persuasion: Reduced Form Approach," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  • Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:22-018
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian Persuasion; Information Design; Mechanism Design; Duality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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