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Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues

Author

Listed:
  • Emir Kamenica

    (University of Chicago)

  • Kyungmin Kim

    (Emory University)

  • Andriy Zapechelnyuk

    (University of St Andrews)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:72:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-021-01383-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01383-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    26. Yeon-Koo Che & Kyungmin Kim & Konrad Mierendorff, 2023. "Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(7), pages 1797-1844.
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    28. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Constrained Information Design," Papers 1811.03588, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
    29. Skreta, Vasiliki & Koessler, Frédéric, 2021. "Information Design by an Informed Designer," CEPR Discussion Papers 15709, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    30. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
    31. Frederic Koessler & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games," Papers 2107.06312, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    32. Guo, Yingni & Shmaya, Eran, 2021. "Costly miscalibration," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(2), May.
    33. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Competition in Persuasion," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(1), pages 300-322.
    34. Maxim Ivanov, 2021. "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 955-1000, October.
    35. Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2021. "Persuasion with costly precision," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 869-908, October.
    36. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2014. "Costly Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 457-462, May.
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    38. Goldstein, Itay & Leitner, Yaron, 2018. "Stress tests and information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 34-69.
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    Cited by:

    1. Semyon Malamud & Andreas Schrimpf, 2021. "Persuasion by Dimension Reduction," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 21-69, Swiss Finance Institute.
    2. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2023. "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1051-1067, November.

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