Preparing for the Worst But Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion
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References listed on IDEAS
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"Information Design: A Unified Perspective,"
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Cited by:
- Semyon Malamud & Andreas Schrimpf, 2021.
"Persuasion by Dimension Reduction,"
Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series
21-69, Swiss Finance Institute.
- Semyon Malamud & Andreas Schrimpf, 2021. "Persuasion by Dimension Reduction," Papers 2110.08884, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
- Alexei Parakhonyak & Anton Sobolev, 2022. "Persuasion without Priors," Economics Series Working Papers 977, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Malamud, Semyon & Cieslak, Anna & Schrimpf, Paul, 2021.
"Optimal Transport of Information,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
15859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Semyon Malamud & Anna Cieslak & Andreas Schrimpf, 2021. "Optimal Transport of Information," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 21-15, Swiss Finance Institute.
- Semyon Malamud & Anna Cieslak & Andreas Schrimpf, 2021. "Optimal Transport of Information," Papers 2102.10909, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
- Tao Lin & Yiling Chen, 2024. "Persuading a Learning Agent," Papers 2402.09721, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
- Xiaoyu Cheng, 2020. "Ambiguous Persuasion: An Ex-Ante Formulation," Papers 2010.05376, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
- Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler, 2021. "Persuasion with Ambiguous Receiver Preferences," Papers 2109.11536, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
- Takashi Ui, 2022. "Optimal and Robust Disclosure of Public Information," Papers 2203.16809, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
- Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin, 2022. "Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 226-248.
- Martin Richardson, 2021. "Of hired guns and ideologues: why would a law firm ever retain an honest expert witness?," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2021-678, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Takashi Ui, 2022. "Optimal and Robust Disclosure of Public Information," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 039, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
- You Zu & Krishnamurthy Iyer & Haifeng Xu, 2021. "Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance," Papers 2102.10156, arXiv.org.
- Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.
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"Information Design: A Unified Perspective,"
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More about this item
Keywords
Persuasion; Information design; Robustness; Worst-case optimality;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2021-05-31 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2021-05-31 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2021-05-31 (Microeconomics)
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