Supplementary Appendix for ‘Non-Bayesian Updating: A Theoretical Framework’

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Supplementary Appendix for ‘Non-Bayesian Updating: A Theoretical Framework’

Author Info

Larry G. Epstein () (Department of Economics, Boston University)
Jawwad Noor () (Department of Economics, Boston University)
Alvaro Sandroni () (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Jawwad Noor

Abstract

This appendix applies the model in ”Non-Bayesian Updating: A Theoretical Frame-Work” to address the question: What do non-Bayesian updaters learn?

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 08-017.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 18 Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:08-017

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104
Phone: 215-898-9992
Fax: 215-573-2378
Email:
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/Centers/pier
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Dolly Guarini).

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Hypothesis Testing
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-05-24 (All new papers)
NEP-CBA-2008-05-24 (Central Banking)
NEP-GTH-2008-05-24 (Game Theory)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 895, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 925, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1991. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Working Papers 91-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
Alvaro Sandroni, 2005. "Efficient markets and Bayes’ rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 741-764, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by editing a NEP report.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.