Innovation Races with the Possibility of Failure
AbstractThe standard innovation race specification assumes a memoryless exponential distribution for the time to success of an R&D project. This specification implies that a project succeeds, eventually, with probability one. We introduce a positive probability that an R&D project fails. With this modified specification, we compare the non-cooperative and cooperative R&D in terms of innovation effort, consumer surplus, and net social welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Otago, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1106.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2011
Date of revision: Aug 2011
innovation; research & development; R&D joint ventures; parallel research projects.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O38 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
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