Nonparametric Identification of Dynamic Games with Discrete and Continuous Choices
AbstractThis paper shows that the payoff functions in a class of dynamic games of incomplete information are nonparametrically identified under standard assumptions currently used in applied work. Models of this kind are prevalent in empirical industrial organization where, for example, firms in oligopolistic industries make discrete entry and exit decisions followed by continuous investment or pricing decisions. We also provide results for single-agent models, a leading special case which is commonly employed in applied microeconomics more generally.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ohio State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 10-02.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
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dynamic games; dynamic discrete choice; nonparametric identification;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C5 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling
- C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-DCM-2010-12-11 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-ECM-2010-12-11 (Econometrics)
- NEP-GTH-2010-12-11 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Patrick Bajari & C. Lanier Benkard & Jonathan Levin, 2007.
"Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition,"
Econometric Society, vol. 75(5), pages 1331-1370, 09.
- Jonathan Levin (Stanford University) & Pat Bajari & Lanier Benkard, 2004. "Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 627, Econometric Society.
- Bajari, Patrick & Benkard, C. Lanier & Levin, Jonathan, 2007. "Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition," Research Papers 1852r1, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- J. Levin & P. Bajari, 2004. "Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition," 2004 Meeting Papers 579, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Patrick Bajari & C. Lanier Benkard & Jonathan Levin, 2004. "Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition," NBER Working Papers 10450, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nathan Yang, 2011. "An Empirical Model of Industry Dynamics with Common Uncertainty and Learning from the Actions of Competitors," Working Papers 11-16, NET Institute.
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