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Dans quelle mesure les incitations tarifaires et la procédure de mise sous accord préalable ont-elles contribué au développement de la chirurgie ambulatoire ?

Author

Listed:
  • A. CAZENAVE-LACROUTZ

    (Insee - Université Paris Dauphine)

  • E. YILMAZ

    (Drees)

Abstract

Afin d’accompagner le développement de la chirurgie ambulatoire (hospitalisation sans nuitée), le ministère de la santé a introduit en 2009 une tarification identique pour les séjours de quelques pathologies quel que soit le mode de prise en charge (en ambulatoire ou avec nuitée et non sévères). Cette incitation tarifaire à réaliser les séjours de chirurgie en ambulatoire a été peu à peu étendue, puis généralisée à partir de 2014, mais son impact sur le changement des pratiques hospitalières reste à mesurer, d’autant plus que, dans le même temps, l’Assurance Maladie implémentait pour un nombre croissant de gestes chirurgicaux une procédure de mise sous accord préalable (MSAP) en cas de prise en charge en hospitalisation complète. Nous tirons parti de la progressivité de la mise en place de ces deux mesures pour évaluer leur impact sur le taux d’ambulatoire des premières pathologies concernées, par comparaison avec les autres pathologies. En présence d’un possible biais de sélection, nous construisons pour chaque pathologie incitée un « contrôle synthétique » à partir de pathologies non incitées. Ce contrôle synthétique permet de reproduire à la fois une perspective de taux de chirurgie ambulatoire à moyen-terme – tel qu’évaluée par des sociétés savantes médicales – et des taux de chirurgie ambulatoire comparables à ceux de la racine incitée avant la mise en place des deux mesures. Pour de nombreuses pathologies visées, les hôpitaux publics ont augmenté la pratique de la chirurgie ambulatoire en réaction à la politique incitative de tarif unique ou à la politique contraignante de MSAP menée à partir de 2008/2009. Cette augmentation ne semble en général pas s’être accompagnée d’une augmentation des réadmissions ou d’une augmentation du nombre total de séjour. Ces effets sont plus rarement observés dans le secteur privé, et ne sont quasiment plus observés dans l’extension en 2012 de l’une ou de l’autre politique.

Suggested Citation

  • A. Cazenave-Lacroutz & E. Yilmaz, 2019. "Dans quelle mesure les incitations tarifaires et la procédure de mise sous accord préalable ont-elles contribué au développement de la chirurgie ambulatoire ?," Documents de Travail de l'Insee - INSEE Working Papers g2019-05, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques.
  • Handle: RePEc:nse:doctra:g2019-05
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    File URL: https://www.bnsp.insee.fr/ark:/12148/bc6p06zrgzj/f1.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Leemore S. Dafny, 2005. "How Do Hospitals Respond to Price Changes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1525-1547, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Milstein, Ricarda & Schreyögg, Jonas, 2022. "Activity-based funding based on diagnosis-related groups: The end of an era? A review of payment reforms in the inpatient sector in ten high-income countries," hche Research Papers 28, University of Hamburg, Hamburg Center for Health Economics (hche).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Chirurgie ambulatoire; Incitations financières; Tarifs; Mise sous accord préalable; Contrôle synthétique;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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