Did Blue Cross and Blue Shield Suffer from Adverse Selection? Evidence from the 1950s
AbstractThis paper uses a unique data set from 1957 to examine whether or not Blue Cross and Blue Shield suffered from an adverse selection death spiral after for-profit commercial insurance companies entered the market for health insurance. Results suggest that moving to experience rating may have helped the Blues counteract adverse selection in the group health insurance market. Adverse selection posed a greater problem for the Blues in the market for individual health insurance, possibly because of differences in the way the Blues screened potential enrollees relative to commercial insurance companies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 9167.
Date of creation: Sep 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Thomasson, Melissa A. "Early Evidence Of An Adverse Selection Death Spiral? The Case Of Blue Cross And Blue Shield," Explorations in Economic History, 2004, v41(4,Oct), 313-328.
Note: DAE HC
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- N72 - Economic History - - Economic History: Transport, International and Domestic Trade, Energy, and Other Services - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
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