Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design
Abstract
This paper examines the optimal allocation of risk in an overlapping-generations economy. It compares the allocation of risk the economy reaches naturally to the allocation that would be reached if generations behind a Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance' could share risk with one another through complete Arrow-Debreu contingent-claims markets. The paper then examines how the government might implement optimal intergenerational risk sharing with a social security system. One conclusion is that the system must either hold equity claims to capital or negatively index benefits to equity returns.Download Info
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 8270.Length:
Date of creation: May 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8270
Note: EFG PE
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Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Laurence Ball & N. Gregory Mankiw, 2007. "Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(4), pages 523-547, 08.
- Ball, Laurence & Mankiw, N. Gregory, 2007. "Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design," Scholarly Articles 3443106, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Laurence Ball & N. Gregory Mankiw, 2001. "Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1921, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Laurence Ball & N Gregory Mankiw, 2001. "Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow Debreu and Rawls with Applications to Social Security Design," Economics Working Paper Archive 478, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
References
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- Feldstein, Martin & Ranguelova, Elena, 2001. "Individual Risk in an Investment-Based Social Security System," Scholarly Articles 2797440, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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