Wage Bargaining and Unemployment Persistence
AbstractThis paper looks at models of unemployment which make two central assumptions. The first is that wages are bargained between firms and employed workers, and that unemployment affects the outcome only to the extent that it affects the labor market prospects of either employed workers or of firms. The second is that the duration of unemployment affects either the search behavior or the skills of the unemployed, and/or the perceptions of firms of such skills. It argues that such models may explain riot only the evolution of European unemployment over the last two decades -an evolution which triggered their development, but many of the cyclical features of labor markets in general.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 3664.
Date of creation: Mar 1991
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 23-3-1, 1991, pp. 277-292.
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Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
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Other versions of this item:
- Blanchard, Olivier Jean, 1991. "Wage Bargaining and Unemployment Persistence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(3), pages 277-92, August.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- L Christofides & A Oswald, 1991.
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- repec:fth:harver:1515 is not listed on IDEAS
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