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Protecting Financial Stability in the Aftermath of World War I: The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's Dissenting Policy

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  • Eugene N. White

Abstract

During the 1920-1921 recession, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta resisted the deflationary policy sanctioned by the Federal Reserve Board and pursued by other Reserve banks. By borrowing gold reserves from other Reserve banks, it facilitated a reallocation of liquidity to its district during the contraction. Viewing the collapse of the price of cotton, the dominant crop in the region, as a systemic shock to the Sixth District, the Atlanta Fed increased discounting and enabled capital infusions to aid its member banks. The Atlanta Fed believed that it had to limit bank failures to prevent a fire sale of cotton collateral that would precipitate a general panic. In this previously unknown episode, the Federal Reserve Board applied considerable pressure on the Atlanta Fed to adhere to its policy and follow a simple Bagehot-style rule. The Atlanta Fed was vindicated when the shock to cotton prices proved to be temporary, and the Board conceded that the Reserve Bank had intervened appropriately.

Suggested Citation

  • Eugene N. White, 2015. "Protecting Financial Stability in the Aftermath of World War I: The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's Dissenting Policy," NBER Working Papers 21341, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21341
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    1. repec:fip:a00001:89439 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Matthew Jaremski & David C. Wheelock, 2020. "Banking on the Boom, Tripped by the Bust: Banks and the World War I Agricultural Price Shock," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(7), pages 1719-1754, October.
    3. Schelkle, Waltraud, 2017. "Hamilton�s Paradox Revisited: Alternative lessons from US history," CEPS Papers 12963, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    4. Haelim Anderson & Daniel Barth & Dong Beom Choi, 2018. "Reducing moral hazard at the expense of market discipline: the effectiveness of double liability before and during the Great Depression," Staff Reports 869, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    5. Masami Imai & Tetsuji Okazaki & Michiru Sawada, 2022. "The effects of lender of last resort on financial intermediation during the great depression in Japan [Ginko Hatan gaoyobosu Densenkoka no Bunseki (The analyses of the effect of contagion caused by," European Review of Economic History, European Historical Economics Society, vol. 26(3), pages 448-478.
    6. Haelim Anderson & Jin-Wook Chang, 2022. "Labor Market Tightness during WWI and the Postwar Recession of 1920-1921," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2022-049, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • N12 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
    • N22 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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