Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Incentive Compatible Trade Policies

Contents:

Author Info

  • Robert C. Feenstra

Abstract

We consider a two country trade model with production uncertainty. If complete contingent markets do not exist, it is desirable for governments to adopt some trade policies to share the production risk. A full information policy involves income transfers across countries, which can be achieved by equal import tariffs and export subsidies. With incomplete information we consider incentive compatible trade policies, which are designed to be truth revealing while partially sharing the production risk. In this case the tariff in one country may differ from the export subsidy abroad.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w1977.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 1977.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 1986
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Feenstra, Robert C. "Incentive Compatible Trade Policies," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1987.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1977

Note: ITI IFM
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Azariadis, Costas & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1983. "Implicit Contracts and Fixed Price Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 1-22, Supplemen.
  2. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1985. "Tariffs as Insurance: Optimal Commercial Policy When Domestic Markets Are Incomplete," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 18(2), pages 258-72, May.
  3. Newbery, David M G & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1982. "The Choice of Techniques and the Optimality of Market Equilibrium with Rational Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 223-46, April.
  4. Azariadis, Costas, 1983. "Employment with Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 157-72, Supplemen.
  5. Sherwin Rosen, 1985. "Implicit Contracts: A Survey," NBER Working Papers 1635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Helpman, Elhanan & Razin, Assaf, 1978. "Welfare Aspects of International Trade in Goods and Securities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(3), pages 489-508, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Bourguignon, Francois & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "Is financial openness bad for education? A political economy perspective on development," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 891-903, May.
  2. J. David Richardson, 1987. "International Coordination of Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 2293, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. James D. Gaisford & William A. Kerr, 1992. "Which Country Loses The Least In A Trade War?," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 36(3), pages 249-274, December.
  4. Gouel, Christophe & Jean, Sebastien, 2012. "Optimal food price stabilization in a small open developing country," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5943, The World Bank.
  5. Richard A. Jensen & Marie Thursby, 1990. "Tariffs with Private Information and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 2959, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Stahl, Dale O. & Turunen-Red, Arja H., 1995. "Tariff games: Cooperation with random variation in political regimes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 215-238, June.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1977. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.