Conforming and Non-conforming Peer Effects in Vaccination Decisions
AbstractTraditional economic models of vaccination assume that agents free-ride on the vaccination decision of others. These models show that private vaccination rates are always below the social optimal and even large subsidies cannot achieve disease eradication. In this paper, we build a model where in addition to the desire to free-ride, agents have a desire to conform to the vaccination decisions of their peers. In this model privately optimal vaccination rates can be higher or lower than the social optimal and thus subsidies for vaccination are not always optimal. However, in certain cases, even small subsidies can achieve disease eradication.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 19528.
Date of creation: Oct 2013
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Note: HC HE
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- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-HEA-2013-10-18 (Health Economics)
- NEP-NET-2013-10-18 (Network Economics)
- NEP-URE-2013-10-18 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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