Do Consumers Exploit Precommitment Opportunities? Evidence from Natural Experiments Involving Liquor Consumption
AbstractThis paper provides evidence concerning the extent to which consumers of liquor employ precommitment devices. One widely recommended precommitment strategy is to regulate alcohol consumption by deliberately manipulating availability. We assess the prevalence of the “availability strategy” by assessing the effects of policies that would influence its effectiveness – specifically, changes in allowable Sunday sales hours. We find that consumers increase their liquor consumption in response to extended Sunday on-premise sales hours, but not in response to extended off-premise sales hours. The latter finding is inconsistent with widespread use of the availability strategy.
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Date of creation: Jan 2012
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
- I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
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- NEP-ALL-2012-02-01 (All new papers)
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