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Endogenous Rationing in a Differentiated Product Duopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Boyer, M.
  • Moreaux, M.

Abstract

Cet Article a Pour Objet L'etude D'un Duopole de Stackelberg a Produits Differencies Lorsque la Concurrence Entre les Firmes Est Soit une Concurrence En Prix-Quantites, Soit En Prix-Capacites de Service. on Montre Qu'a L'equilibre, Dans le Modele Prix-Quantite le Meneur Choisira Toujours de Rationner la Demande Qui S'adresse a Lui Alors Que Dans le Modele Prix-Capacites de Service le Meneur Ne Rationnera la Demande Que Si les Biens Sont des Substituts Suffisamment Proches. on Dispose Donc D'une Structure de Marche Dans Laquelle, a L'equilibre, Certains Agents Sont Rationnes. Ce Resultats Est Specifique a la Structure de Stackelberg. Il N'y a Jamais Rationnement a L'equilibre, Avec les Memes Espaces de Strategies, Si les Firmes Font Mouvement Simultanement.

Suggested Citation

  • Boyer, M. & Moreaux, M., 1988. "Endogenous Rationing in a Differentiated Product Duopoly," Cahiers de recherche 8830, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:8830
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yousefimanesh, Niloofar & Bos, Iwan & Vermeulen, Dries, 2023. "Strategic rationing in Stackelberg games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 529-555.
    2. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock, 2011. "Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 29-74, May.
    3. Boyer, Marcel & Lasserre, Pierre & Moreaux, Michel, 2012. "A dynamic duopoly investment game without commitment under uncertain market expansion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 663-681.
    4. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1989. "Rationnement endogène et structure de marché," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 65(1), pages 119-145, mars.
    5. Bos, Iwan & Vermeulen, Dries, 2021. "On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in price–quantity games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    6. Bos, Iwan & Vermeulen, Dries, 2021. "Equilibrium existence with spillover demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    7. Marcel Boyer & Pierre Lasserre & Thomas Mariotti & Michel Moreaux, 2001. "Preemption and Rent Dissipation under Bertrand Competition," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 20-04, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
    8. Heywood, John S. & Li, Dongyang & Ye, Guangliang, 2023. "Private provision of price excludable public goods by rivals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 291-307.
    9. Tasnadi, Attila, 2002. "On probabilistic rationing methods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 211-221, November.
    10. Marcel Boyer & Pierre Lasserre & Thomas Mariotti & Michel Moreaux, 2000. "Preemption and Rent Dissipation with Multiple Investments," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-06, CIRANO.

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