In this paper, we ask three questions about reference-dependent preferences (RDP) : to what extent can they be said to be irrational ? What is the mechanism that underlies reference dependence? How to design welfare improving policies when preferences are reference-dependent? As to the first question, we characterize three notions of rationality to assess the rationality of RDP and show that there is a sense in which they are rational. As to the second, we show that the effect of a shifting reference point is two-sided : first modifying the relevant criteria for choice and second modifying the desirability of an option. As to the third question we define a welfare ordering based on the comparison of the strength of the status quo bias and show how to relate it to the representation of preferences.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: